A New American Security Doctrine — And Europe’s Strategic Choice

From time to time, Washington publishes a document called the National Security Strategy. Most people never read it. They - everyone -  should read this one. The new strategy coming out of a Trump administration is not just another technical paper. It is brutally short, startlingly blunt – and unusually honest about how its authors see America and the world.

For decades, US governments – Republican and Democrat alike – have wrapped power in the language of partnership: shared values, alliances, a rules-based order, joint responsibility for global problems from security to climate. The gap between words and deeds has ofta been large, but the words har ändå spelat roll. They imposed limits. They created expectations. They signalled that legitimacy mattered.

This strategy tears that frame away.

From “leader of the free world” to solitary empire

In earlier strategies, the US cast itself as leader among allies: primus inter pares. Even when it acted unilaterally, it still insisted that alliances were central and that democracy, human rights and international law were strategic assets.

The new doctrine reads like a declaration that all of that is over.

Alliances are no longer described as communities of shared values, but as instruments to be used – or discarded – in pursuit of narrowly defined national interest. International institutions appear mostly as obstacles. Climate and environmental issues, so prominent in recent strategies, are reduced to a passing annoyance: an excuse for “fanatical” regulation and costly constraints.

Even more striking is where the document turns its fire. The traditional “adversaries” – Russia, China, North Korea – are pushed to the margins. Instead, Western Europe and the European Union are portrayed as a central strategic problem.

Reading between the lines, the message is clear:

America intends to remain the world’s dominant power – but it wants to do so largely alone, and it now views an assertive, rules-based European Union not as a partner, but as a rival.

From ally to vassal

The language used about Europe is unusually revealing.

European governments that defend the rule of law or try to contain extremist forces are accused of “abusing democracy” and “trampling on rights”. EU efforts to regulate digital platforms, limit disinformation and protect citizens’ data are branded as “censorship” and “economic suicide”. Climate and environmental standards are caricatured as ideological obsessions that hurt “real people”.

Underneath the rhetoric lies a simple logic:

• The European Union, with its competition policy, digital regulation and climate agenda, is seen as a threat to American corporate and geopolitical power.

• Far-right “patriotic” parties are described, implicitly or explicitly, as natural allies, because they promise to weaken the EU from within, dismantle common rules and return to a Europe of fragmented nation states.

• NATO allies are no longer treated as partners with agency, but as dependants expected to buy American weapons, follow American strategic choices – and accept open political interference in their domestic politics.

This is not traditional Atlanticism, frustrated but loyal. It is a strategic downgrading of Europe from ally to vassal.

What is truly astonishing is that the doctrine says the quiet part out loud. For years, critics have claimed that the US treats its allies as subordinates. Now, in effect, Washington is saying: “Yes. And we intend to do so more openly.”

A world made more dangerous – including for America

Supporters of this doctrine argue that it is simply honest: a clean break with hypocrisy, a return to “realism”. That reading is too kind.

A realism worthy of the name begins by taking consequences seriously. Here, the consequences are obvious – and profoundly negative.

By undermining the European Union and betting openly on forces that want to hollow out liberal democracy from within, Washington is not just weakening a rival regulator. It is destabilising its most important democratic partner. It is encouraging a more fragmented, nationalist, heavily armed Europe with fewer common rules and more potential fault-lines.

By signalling indifference to Russian and Chinese ambitions, it is sending a message to Moscow and Beijing that the West is divided and that Europe can be picked off, pressured and penetrated piecemeal.

By trivialising climate and environmental risks – or treating them as someone else’s problem – it is increasing the likelihood of crises and conflicts that no wall, tariff or slogan can hold back.

Far from making America safer, this approach creates exactly the kind of volatile, polarised and conflict-prone world in which even a superpower becomes more vulnerable.

Europe’s uncomfortable choice

For Europe, however, the key question is not why Washington is doing this. It is how we respond.

We face an uncomfortable but unavoidable choice:

We can pretend that nothing fundamental has changed. We can continue to speak the familiar language of “indispensable partnership”, smile for the cameras, and privately hope that this doctrine will never quite be implemented.

Or we can accept that the mask is off – and begin to act accordingly.

Acting accordingly does not mean turning anti-American. The United States is more than its federal government: it is cities, states, universities, companies and millions of citizens who do not share this worldview. We should deepen those ties, not weaken them.

But it does mean that Europe can no longer outsource its security, its technological future or its political direction to Washington.

A call for European leadership

If the Trump doctrine is a warning, it is also an invitation – or perhaps a demand – that Europe finally grows up strategically.

That starts with security.

Europe must be able to sustain support for Ukraine and deter further Russian aggression even under conditions of American ambivalence or pressure. That requires stronger defence industries, more joint procurement, and a realistic division of labour within NATO where Europe carries a much larger share.

It continues with technology and economic sovereignty.

Whoever controls data, digital platforms, payment systems and critical supply chains holds enormous leverage. The EU’s attempts to regulate Big Tech, enforce competition and protect strategic industries are not bureaucratic hobbies – they are elements of security policy. They must be defended calmly but firmly, even when they collide with US commercial interests.

And it extends to the climate and green transition – not as a moral add-on, but as a core element of long-term stability and competitiveness. Even if Washington loses interest in climate diplomacy, Europe cannot afford to do so. Our credibility with younger generations, with partner countries and with our own industrial base depends on making the transition work – economically, socially, and technologically.

Strategic chaos – or strategic responsibility

The new American security doctrine seems to embrace what one might call strategic chaos: a belief that a powerful state can thrive in a world of rising tension, polarisation and instability, simply by being stronger than everyone else.

Europe does not have that option.

Our societies are too open, our economies too interdependent and our geography too exposed. We need a functioning international order more than almost any other region on earth.

That is why this moment matters.

We can accept the role the doctrine writes for us: divided, dependent, permanently reactive.

Or we can treat it as what it also is: a wake-up call, a line in the sand, a reminder that strategic responsibility for our own future now lies in European hands.

The latest US National Security Strategy tells us, with unusual clarity, how at least one future Washington sees the world.

The remaining question is whether Europe is finally ready to answer with a strategy of its own.

Mathias Knutsson